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BENJAMIN MEANS*
ABSTRACT
According to conventional wisdom, insider control of businesses is
detrimental to the interests of noncontrolling investors. Family-run
businesses, in particular, are seen as nepotistic and inefficient. Yet,
commentators have overestimated the dangers of insider control and
overlooked its potential benefits for all stakeholders. Controlling
owners have a personal stake that gives them reason to identify with
their business and to adopt responsible business practices capable of
creating lasting value. A stewardship model of insider control helps
explain the continuing vitality of family businesses as well as the
success of recent public offerings by Facebook, Google, and Snapchat
involving low-vote or no-vote stock. Consequently, this Article crit-
icizes efforts to limit insider control categorically—for example, re-
cent moves by stock exchanges to block companies that issue stock
with unequal voting rights. To the extent controlling shareholders
are tempted to abuse their control in particular cases, this Article
contends that the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty provide an
appropriate basis for judicial monitoring.
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. I am grateful to Derek
Black, Josie Brown, Anthony Casey, Kevin Haeberle, Cathy Hwang, and Susan Kuo for their
comments and suggestions. Candle Wester provided excellent research assistance, and I very
much appreciate Vanessa McQuinn’s administrative support.
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INTRODUCTION
Insider control has emerged as one of the hottest topics in
corporate governance in the wake of public offerings by prominent
technology companies such as Google, Facebook, and Snapchat
involving low-vote or no-vote stock.1 Dual-stock classification dis-
tinguishes founder stock from common stock and thereby enables
founders to raise money from the capital markets without surren-
dering the perquisites of control.2 
Critics charge that dual-stock classification should be restricted
or disallowed because it shackles controlled companies to the vi-
sion of their founders even when there is no longer good reason to
defer to that vision.3 For example, Sumner Redstone remained in
control of Viacom and CBS long after it had become apparent that
he lacked the capacity to make business decisions.4 The fact that
family businesses pioneered the use of dual-class stock in order to
1. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-
Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585 (2017); Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private Ordering Defense of
a Company’s Right to Use Dual Class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2018);
Kirby Smith, The Agency Costs of Equal Treatment Clauses, 127 YALE L.J. F. 543 (2017); Tian
Wen, Comment, You Can’t Sell Your Firm and Own It Too: Disallowing Dual-Class Stock
Companies from Listing on the Securities Exchanges, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2014); Andrea
Tan & Benjamin Robertson, Dual-Class Shares Are Coming Under Fire—Again, BLOOMBERG
MKTS. MAG. (Sept. 27, 2017, 8:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-27/
can-democracy-stage-a-comeback-at-stock-exchanges [https://perma.cc/T2HJ-HPFF].
2. See Ronald W. Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN.
1697, 1722 (2009); Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 687 (1986). Companies
with dual-class stock “play an important role in the U.S. economy.... and ha[d] an aggregate
market capitalization exceeding $3 trillion as of July 2016.” Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note
1, at 594.
3. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 1, at 590 (“Going forward, the debate should
be limited to the choice between (1) precluding dual-class structures altogether and (2)
permitting dual-class structures that sunset after a fixed period of time (such as ten or fifteen
years) unless their extension is approved by shareholders unaffiliated with the controller.”).
4. See id. at 587-88 (“[P]ublic investors, who own approximately 90 [percent] of Viacom’s
equity capital, remained powerless and without influence over the company or the battle for
its control.”). As a practical matter, the family’s decision-making is now in the hands of
Sumner Redstone’s daughter, Sheri Redstone. See Jessica Toonkel, Sumner Redstone Removes
Viacom CEO and Board Member From Trust, REUTERS (May 20, 2016, 10:22 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-redstone-trust/sumner-redstone-removes-viacom-ceo-and-board-
member-from-trust-idUSKCN0YC02K [https://perma.cc/BN8S-XWXQ].
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perpetuate family control only exacerbates the critique of controlled
companies.5
This Article contends, to the contrary, that family businesses
illustrate why controlled companies can be attractive to investors
and other stakeholders. In particular, family values can motivate
responsible business practices. For example, acting as stewards for
future generations, family owners often prioritize sustainability
over more immediate payouts.6 A focus on long-term viability bene-
fits nonfamily groups as well, including value investors, employees,
customers, and communities.7
Although reconciling family and business interests can be
challenging,8 “[f]amily businesses are ubiquitous in the United
States and are often described as ‘the backbone’ of the American
economy.”9 In fact, studies suggest that family businesses may
outperform nonfamily businesses in the marketplace.10 Notably,
5. See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 1, at 605 (citing “the problem of the ‘idiot heir’”).
According to Bebchuk and Kastiel, “A structure that provides the founder’s family with a
perpetual lock on control forgoes the benefits of optimal succession of leadership upon the
founder’s departure.” Id. Currently, “[f]ounders or their descendants control nearly 89% of
dual class firms.” Ronald Anderson et al., The Dual Class Premium: A Family Affair (Fox Sch.
Bus. Res. Paper No. 17-021, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3006669 [https://perma.cc/MA8K-AJJD].
6. See CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INST., FAMILY BUSINESSES: SUSTAINING PERFORMANCE
3 (2012), https://research-doc.credit-suisse.com/docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&source
=em&document_id=999615271&serialid=ar%2BmiufackjVY15u5tKdzgvcLatsFZZZ05m%2
BATD8dI8%3D [https://perma.cc/7FXT-BKNW] (reporting survey results of 280 family
businesses: “At least three quarters of respondents see a long-term perspective as key to
success; most have a long-term payback approach to investment and focus on an internal
rather than external financing model to fund future growth”).
7. See generally William Mullins & Antoinette Schoar, How Do CEOs See Their Roles?
Management Philosophies and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 24
(2016) (reporting survey results of more than 800 CEOs). The authors also included nonfamily
businesses in their study and found that “[f]ounders and CEOs related to the firm’s founder
are more likely to embrace a stakeholder view of management and feel less responsibility
towards their shareholders, instead prioritizing employees and creditors.” Id. at 25.
8. See Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1185, 1189 (2013) (“In a family business ... the values associated with family life must
coexist with the values of the marketplace.” (footnote omitted)).
9. Allison Anna Tait, Corporate Family Law, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017) (citing
ANDREA COLLI, THE HISTORY OF FAMILY BUSINESS, 1850-2000, at 8 (2003)). Family businesses
are also a dominant force globally. See Belén Villalonga & Raphael Amit, Family Control of
Firms and Industries, 39 FIN. MGMT. 863, 863 (2010) (“Family-controlled firms dominate the
corporate landscape around the world.”).
10. The empirical data is inconclusive but suggests that founder-led businesses have a
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many of the most successful U.S. businesses are family control-
led—for example, Ford Motor Company,11 Wal-Mart Stores,
Incorporated,12 Mars, Incorporated,13 Cargill, Incorporated,14 and
Hobby Lobby Stores, Incorporated.15 According to one estimate,
about a third of Fortune 500 companies are family controlled.16 In
sum, far from serving as a cautionary tale regarding the dangers
of insider control, family businesses offer a useful model.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I contends that the perpet-
uation of insider control should not be equated with the nepotistic
hiring and promotion of unqualified individuals.17 More commonly,
the next generation of owners are carefully groomed for manageri-
al responsibilities and must demonstrate their capacity to lead.18
Parts II and III respond to a different type of concern: that
controlling owners will abuse their position to expropriate value
without sharing it with minority investors. Part II argues that stew-
ardship provides a plausible alternative explanation for insider-
favoring models of control. Part III contends that the fiduciary
competitive advantage, at least until succession to the next generation of family ownership.
See Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Per-
formance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301, 1316-17 (2003); Belen Villalonga &
Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value?, 80
J. FIN. ECON. 385, 402-03 (2006).
11. See Anderson & Reeb, supra note 10, at 1306.
12. See Benjamin Means, Wealth Inequality and Family Businesses, 65 EMORY L.J. 937,
939 n.11 (2016) (citing Nick Kirkpatrick & Justin Moyer, Meet America’s Richest Families,




15. See Tait, supra note 9, at 6.
16. See id. (quoting Family Business Facts, CONWAY CTR. FOR FAM. BUS., http://www.
familybusinesscenter.com/resources/family-business-facts); see also Anderson & Reeb, supra
note 10, at 1301.
17. Thus, to use “nepotism” as a synonym for “kinship preferences” is to assume an
impropriety that must be demonstrated. See Joan G. Wexler, Husbands and Wives: The
Uneasy Case for Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U. L. REV. 75, 75 (1982) (“The term nepotism is a
pejorative which connotes favoritism, undeserved rewards, or unfair discrimination in
granting employment or other advantages to relatives.”).
18. From a broader perspective, one might still object that preferential access creates
inequality, a problem that is conceptually distinct from considerations of individual merit. See
Means, supra note 12, at 940-41 (acknowledging the problem but arguing that “family
businesses can increase the distribution of wealth by providing needed investments in human
capital” and by providing “a source of opportunity, not just for family members, but also for
employees and the communities in which family businesses operate”).
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duties of care and loyalty suffice to protect the minority from
mistreatment. The Article concludes that legislative or regulatory
restrictions—for example, mandatory time limits on insider con-
trol—could have the unintended consequence of deterring steward-
ship. The benefits of family ownership and other forms of insider
control need not be taken on faith, but neither should they be
rejected as a matter of principle.
I. NEPOTISM, INC.?
If insider control is to continue past a company’s founding stage,
there must be a strategy to perpetuate it.19 Notably, most family
businesses use kinship as an important criterion for the selection
of key personnel.20 “Family heirs benefit not only from inherited
wealth but also from access to employment opportunities reserved
for them.”21 The inheritance of managerial responsibilities may
seem to fit the classic definition of nepotism: unfair preferences
based on kinship.22 This Part argues, however, that insider-favor-
ing models of control need not conflict with appropriate standards
of merit.
A. The Merit Paradigm
If we are to avoid the reductio ad absurdum of concluding that
all kinship preferences are nepotism, even the care and affection
that parents provide for children within the family, we must find
some means of distinguishing nepotistic and non-nepotistic kinship
preferences. Nepotism refers not just to the existence of a kinship
19. See id. at 977 (quoting Danny Miller, Isabelle Le Brenton-Miller & Barry Scholnick,
Stewardship v. Stagnation: An Empirical Comparison of Small Family and Non-Family
Businesses, 45 J. MGMT. STUD. 51, 52 (2008)).
20. See id. at 939.
21. Id. at 985.
22. See Wexler, supra note 17, at 75; see also STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE, THE MERITOCRACY
MYTH 43 (4th ed. 2018) (“[M]eritocracy applies strictly only to the poorest of the poor;
everyone else has at least some advantage of inheritance over others that places them ahead
at the start of the race.”). When favoritism turns on personal connections other than kinship,
it is called “cronyism.” See Michela Ponzo & Vincenzo Scoppa, A Simple Model of Nepotism
1 (Università Della Calabria, Working Paper No. 17-2010), http://www.ecostat.unical.it/Re
PEc/WorkingPapers/WP17_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/F42D-YB8J].
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preference, but to the context in which it arises.23 Some social goods
are properly assigned using kinship as a criterion; others are not.24
The philosopher Michael Walzer has argued that “there has never
been a single criterion ... for all distributions.”25 Instead, each kind
of social good should be handled according to the procedures
appropriate for it.26 Intimate relationships, political choices, and im-
personal market transactions take place in separate spheres and
are governed by different rules.27 For instance, because some goods
involve matters of intimacy, people are not supposed to exchange
them for money.28 In other circumstances, where market conven-
tions apply, money is all that is expected to matter.29 When we seek
to ascertain whether a kinship preference should be considered
nepotism, the particular context is crucial.30 We must ask, specifical-
ly, whether kinship preferences are permissible in that sphere.31
Yet, Walzer’s proposed mode of analysis does not tell us whether
kinship preferences in family-owned business are improper because
the spheres of family and business overlap.32 An intention to pass
23. See ADAM BELLOW, IN PRAISE OF NEPOTISM: A HISTORY OF FAMILY ENTERPRISE FROM
KING DAVID TO GEORGE W. BUSH 23-24 (First Anchor Books 2004) (2003).
24. See id. (“I am very far from wanting to suggest that what we call nepotism is simply
the operation of a normal and natural preference for kin. Nepotism is properly defined as
‘undue preference for a relative’ where fair and open competition should prevail.”).
25. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 4 (1983) (“Desert, qualification, birth and
blood, friendship, need, free exchange, political loyalty, democratic decision: each has had its
place, along with many others, uneasily coexisting, invoked by competing groups, confused
with one another.”); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993);
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Bernard Williams, The Idea of
Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 110 (Peter Laslett & W. G. Runciman eds.,
2d ser. 1962).
26. WALZER, supra note 25, at 10 (“Every social good or set of goods constitutes, as it were,
a distributive sphere within which only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate.”).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 9 (“[T]he words prostitution and bribery ... describe the sale and purchase
of goods that, given certain understandings of their meaning, ought never to be sold or
purchased.”).
29. See id. at 10 (“Whatever can rightly be sold ought to be sold to pious men and women
and also to profane, heretical, and sinful men and women.”).
30. See BELLOW, supra note 23, at 23-24.
31. In arguing for distinctive spheres, Walzer recognizes that “[w]hat happens in one
distributive sphere affects what happens in the others; we can look, at most, for relative
autonomy.” WALZER, supra note 25, at 10.
32. See Means, supra note 8, at 1189 (“In a family business, ... the values associated with
family life must coexist with the values of the marketplace.” (footnote omitted) (citing
MANFRED F.R. KETS DE VRIES ET AL., FAMILY BUSINESS ON THE COUCH 9 (2007))).
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control from generation to generation is a constitutive element of
family businesses.33 The appropriateness of kinship preferences is,
therefore, inseparable from broader questions about the role of
family businesses in society.34
Perhaps family ownership does not make a difference and kinship
preferences should be considered improper in any business context.
Even if participants have preexisting relationships that affect their
goals and their mutual expectations,35 they are still joined in a for-
profit venture. Further, by selecting a corporate, limited liability
company, or partnership form, a family business could be said to
have accepted the market principles applicable to that form of busi-
ness.36 There is no separate, family-business entity form available.37
Across all forms of business associations, merit is the accepted prin-
ciple for the distribution of opportunities in the workplace.38
Kinship preferences in family businesses may be problematic be-
cause they appear to violate the principle of distribution according
to merit. That is, family businesses involve the preferential trans-
mission of direct economic advantage to insiders as to employment
matters—such as hiring and promotion—that would ordinarily
depend on formally neutral criteria.39 The fact that a family owns a
business does not prove that kinship preferences in the workplace
are inevitable or appropriate. If the family wished to do so, it could
hire professional managers to run the business.
On the other hand, we might ask who has grounds to complain
about kinship preferences.40 If a business does not sell its stock to
the general public but the stock is instead held by a single family,
33. See Means, supra note 12, at 939.
34. See id. at 939-41.
35. See Means, supra note 8, at 1209 (“An employer-employee relationship may also be
a parent-child relationship.”).
36. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 26 (2010).
37. See Means, supra note 8, at 1193.
38. Opportunities in this context should be broadly understood to include not only hiring
and promotion, but also performance evaluation. See Bridgette K. Mulder, A Model of
Organizational Nepotism, in NEPOTISM IN ORGANIZATIONS 219, 220 (Robert G. Jones ed.,
2012). Failure to discipline or fire an employee because of kinship might also qualify as
nepotism. See id.
39. See BELLOW, supra note 23, at 11 (The practice of nepotism “violates our basic sense
of fairness and elicits strong reactions of revulsion and distaste.”).
40. See infra Part III (examining the fiduciary duties that protect the interests of
noncontrolling owners).
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the business is, effectively, the family’s property.41 In this regard,
one scholar suggests that public affirmative action policies elicit
greater concern because they involve the allocation of resources that
are open to all members of society, whereas, “in the case of a family-
owned business in which nepotistic hiring is a stage in a process
that will end with intergenerational transfer of the business itself,
we see nepotism as completely legitimate.”42 Why, after all, should
a family have an obligation to distribute its assets to strangers?
Perhaps employment in a family business is no less a family asset
than any other kind of wealth.43 Consider three approaches to trans-
ferring wealth across generations:
Version One. An entrepreneur builds a successful business.
Rather than giving the business to her children, she sells it
before her death and leaves her children the proceeds of the sale
in equal shares.
Version Two. An entrepreneur builds a successful business. She
leaves control of the business to her children in equal shares.
The children sell the business and split the proceeds.
Version Three. An entrepreneur builds a successful business.
She employs her children in the business, and, ultimately,
transfers control of the business to them. They continue to
operate the business.
In each case, setting aside any tax considerations that might
pertain, the parent bequeaths substantially identical economic
resources to her children. The children benefit from the morally ar-
bitrary fact that they have a wealthy parent, whether or not they
receive the money directly or access it through the business orga-
nization. If the financial consequences are identical, and if there is
no public policy reason to prefer that the parent use one form of
41. By contrast, the managers of a publicly traded corporation take on a fiduciary
responsibility to widely dispersed investors who have entrusted their capital to the enterprise
without any direct ability to control its use. See generally D. Gordon Smith, The Critical
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002).
42. Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate,
95 MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1699 (1997) (reviewing several books on affirmative action).
43. See Means, supra note 12, at 985.
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estate plan instead of another, then it is unclear what purpose is
served by drawing normative distinctions.44
As long as families are permitted to raise children, it is unrealis-
tic to insist that families will convey certain benefits while withhold-
ing others. Indeed, family members are expected, and in some
respects legally obligated, to care for one another.45 One commenta-
tor argues that “[w]e have a duty to be nepotistic, and if we fail to
put our families first we may destroy the very sources of altruism on
which society depends.”46 Thus, if nepotism denotes an “unfair
preference to a relative”47 over other qualified persons, kinship-
based preferences in family businesses may not qualify.48
Moreover, concerns about kinship preferences may be misplaced
when kinship ties are marital in nature. In such cases, it is de-
batable whether there has been a distribution, let alone a prefer-
ence.49 Within a marriage, business assets are hard to distinguish
“from the broader economic life of a household.”50 That is, each
spouse would likely be entitled to half the value of the family’s
business investment regardless of the formal ownership records
because the business assets are treated as part of the economic
partnership of marriage.51 A spouse’s involvement in a business may
44. A broader issue of opportunity inequality is implicated regardless of the form of
inheritance. See id. at 942.
45. See BELLOW, supra note 23, at 476 (“[M]any Americans agree with Robert Frost in
defining home as the place where, when you have nowhere else to go, ‘they have to take you
in.’”); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY
L.J. 251, 263 (2010) (“The family is the mechanism by which we privatize ... dependency and
its implications.”).
46. BELLOW, supra note 23, at 476.
47. Nepotism, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/126151?
redirectFrom=nepotism#eid [https://perma.cc/W9XK-ZV3L].
48. In businesses that are family controlled but involve other owners, the situation is
more complex, as nonfamily investors might reasonably view family preferences as self-
dealing. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 510-11
(Mass. 1975) (children caused the corporation to repurchase shares from a retiring parent,
who had been the controlling shareholder, but refused to provide similar liquidity for an
unrelated minority investor).
49. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
50. Benjamin Means, The Contractual Foundation of Family-Business Law, 75 OHIO ST.
L.J. 675, 693 (2014). Note that “[i]n its pristine form, coverture treated husband and wife as
indistinguishable legal actors from the perspective of the outside world.” VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 67 (2005).
51. See Tait, supra note 9, at 30.
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be seen as a feature of the marriage rather than an example of
nepotism.52
To summarize, even if business and family constitute separate
spheres as a matter of conceptual logic, invoking those spheres
does not guide the use of kinship preferences in family businesses.
Neither sphere controls the outcome because family businesses (and
families, more generally) involve an intermingling of economics and
intimacy. Indeed, the conspicuous lack of an answer in this setting
suggests that Walzer’s spheres are unlikely to provide clear
guidance regarding the distribution of resources in most disputed
cases.53 Rather than seeking categorical answers, perhaps it would
be more fruitful for us to inquire whether particular insider-favoring
decisions are well supported or represent a departure from mini-
mum standards. The next section argues that the continuation of
insider control can reflect merit-based judgments. In this regard,
while kinship preferences in family businesses may be motivated in
part by other considerations, family owners are likely to take steps
to ensure that heirs are properly qualified and to insist upon the
satisfaction of objective criteria.
B. Kinship as Qualification
Insider preferences cannot stand alone as the basis for decision-
making in controlled companies. Perhaps most objectionably, a
powerful benefactor might confer business opportunities—office,
title, salary—regardless of qualifications. To ignore merit and to
prefer fellow insiders in all circumstances is cronyism in its most
52. A spouse’s involvement looks more like nepotism when the spouse takes on a role in
the business that would ordinarily have an independent merit qualification—as when the
director Roman Polanski cast his wife, Emmanuelle Seigner, as a colead in the movie Venus
in Fur. See Amy Taubin, Venus in Fur, 50 FILM COMMENT 69, 69 (2014). Favorable reviews,
including observations that the plot may resemble the Polanski marriage in certain respects,
see id., indicate that the casting decision may nonetheless have been well-considered. Cf.
Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 10 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (opera singer hired to promote company was
wife of the chair of the board of directors but had appropriate qualifications).
53. See ZELIZER, supra note 50, at 33 (“In any particular social setting—not only
households, but also workplaces, schools, churches, and clubs—multiple ties of different kinds
coexist and often extend across the setting’s boundary into other settings.”); Frances E. Olsen,
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497,
1497 (1983); supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
902 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:891
barefaced incarnation.54 Yet, rarely will the case be so clear. In a
family business, a child might spend summers working for the
business and, over time, develop the competence to run it. These
types of opportunities are not available to outsiders. As one com-
mentator observed, “[g]rowing up around a business or vocation—
learning how it works, getting to know the people in it—creates a
powerful advantage that is tantamount to nepotism.”55 Such indirect
advantages elude easy categorization.56
1. The Boss’s Nephew
The term nepotism was first used to describe the improper prac-
tice of Renaissance-era popes who appointed nephews (perhaps
actually illegitimate sons)57 to important ecclesiastical positions,
thereby cementing family power and prestige, a danger the Church
had seemingly hoped to forestall by forbidding clergy from mar-
riage: “Since it was one of the purposes of clerical celibacy to cut the
church loose from the feudal system and to ensure a succession of
qualified individuals, the practice was identified as sinful early
on.”58
Nepotism continues to conjure an unpleasant image of patron-
age and of incompetent or lazy heirs trading on their family con-
nections, eclipsing the career prospects of more qualified but less
connected peers.59 We might call this the problem of the meritorious
outsider.60 As one commentator puts it, “from the workingman’s per-
spective nepotism means hiring or promoting the boss’s son-in-law,
nephew, or girlfriend over the heads of more qualified candidates.”61
54. See supra note 22.
55. BELLOW, supra note 23, at 10.
56. See Harvey S. James, Jr., What Can the Family Contribute to Business? Examining
Contractual Relationships, 12 FAM. BUS. REV. 61, 61 (1999) (“To the extent that family
processes contribute to the efficient and effective functioning of the company, family
businesses will survive and thrive.”).
57. BELLOW, supra note 23, at 11 (“The term nepotismo was coined sometime in the
fourteenth or fifteenth century to describe the corrupt practice of appointing papal relatives
to office—usually illegitimate sons described as ‘nephews.’”).
58. WALZER, supra note 25, at 147; see also BELLOW, supra note 23, at 191 (“The
Renaissance papacy is one of the greatest monuments to nepotism in Western history.”).
59. See BELLOW, supra note 23, at 11; supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
60. My thanks to Professor Kenneth Rosen who proposed the terminology.
61. BELLOW, supra note 23, at 11.
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A satirical newspaper captured the perceived injustice of nepotism
in a made-up news blurb reporting a hiring decision:
WHITEHOUSE STATION, NJ—The hiring of Adam Dwyer by
Merck Pharmaceutical was described Monday by CEO James
Dwyer as “tremendously synergistic.” “With his impressive
range of experiences, including one and a half years of bartend-
ing and four years of heavy pharmaceutical use at the Univer-
sity of Delaware, Adam brings a lot to the table,” Dwyer said of
his nephew. “We, in turn, can help Adam earn $220,000 a year
as vice-president of corporate communications for the Mid-
Atlantic region.”62
The intended humor is in the unembarrassed, matter-of-fact
disclosure of motivations that would not be acknowledged, let alone
trumpeted in a press release. And yet, sarcasm aside, some version
of “nepotism is often the rule in family businesses, and it is usually
accepted as ‘the way things are’ by everyone involved.”63 Successful
family businesses seem to rise above accusations of nepotism,
perhaps because the heirs are not often so dismally qualified.64
In family businesses, merit remains an important factor in hiring
and promotion.65 Therefore, the concept of nepotism is potentially
misleading because it obscures the manner in which kinship
preferences normally function. Although the formal definition of
nepotism—favoritism based on kinship66—does not specify any
central or less-central examples, it is a feature of human reasoning
that we organize concepts according to prototypes.67 For example,
62. Nepotism Passed Off as Synergy, ONION (June 20, 2001, 3:00 PM), https://www.
theonion.com/nepotism-passed-off-as-synergy-1819566082 [https://perma.cc/R6Q4-DNRQ]; see
also CEO Worked Way Up from Son of CEO, ONION (Oct. 24, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://local.
theonion.com/ceo-worked-way-up-from-son-of-ceo-1819575776 [https://perma.cc/FB98-CSRL];
Jaden Smith, Perhaps the Gimmick of My Father and Me Starring in a Movie is Actually More
Annoying than Appealing, ONION (May 31, 2013, 3:20 PM), https://entertainment.theonion.
com/perhaps-the-gimmick-of-my-father-and-me-starring-in-a-m-1819584865 [https://perma.cc/
482S-VV7E].
63. BELLOW, supra note 23, at 11.
64. See, e.g., infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
65. See infra Part III (describing market and legal constraints on kinship preferences).
66. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
67. Nepotism’s definition establishes a category, and all examples that meet the definition
fall within the category. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1385 (1988) (“In the classical theory of categorization,
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strawberries are more central to our understanding of the concept
“fruit” than tomatoes, bell peppers, or olives.68 Prototype “categories
are structured by means of idealized cognitive models—culturally
shared ‘theories’ of how to organize some portion of our experi-
ence.”69 When the concept is nepotism, we are likely to picture the
polo playing, feckless heir, rather than a well-qualified understudy
who receives special opportunities but makes the most of them.70
Consequently, hiring decisions involving relatives with outstand-
ing credentials look like outliers and may be difficult to reconcile
with our basic understanding of nepotism. That is, “[b]ecause ‘proto-
types act as cognitive reference points of various sorts and form the
basis for inferences,’ they tend to play an important role in reason-
ing about categories.”71 We might paint with too broad a brush and
treat kinship preferences as an affront to meritocratic principles,
even those kinship preferences that do not involve the preservation
of unearned privileges or the elevation of the incompetent.72 For this
reason, the position of the heir can carry with it a stigma, which
“arises from the belief that nepotism is not just favoring a relative,
but also favoring someone who is unqualified or incompetent com-
pared to other applicants.”73 Customers and colleagues alike may be
too quick to conclude that the heir is lacking.74
all objects having the same relevant criteria are classed together. In this view, no category
member is any more ‘representative’ of a category than another.”).
68. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 123 (1980).
69. Winter, supra note 67, at 1385.
70. Admittedly, polo-playing heirs are not entirely mythical creatures. See The Checkered
Past of August Busch IV, CBS NEWS (Dec. 28, 2010, 8:37 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/the-checkered-past-of-august-busch-iv/ [https://perma.cc/UW8G-4EYL] (reporting legal
travails of August Busch IV, also known as the Fourth, “heir to his family’s beer fortune” and
CEO of the company before it was sold). For detailed reporting concerning the
mismanagement that led to the company’s forced sale to an international conglomerate, see
JULIE MACINTOSH, DETHRONING THE KING: THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER OF ANHEUSER-BUSCH, AN
AMERICAN ICON (2011).
71. Winter, supra note 67, at 1386 (footnote and internal citations omitted).
72. See id. (“Sometimes, we may not distinguish the variants from the prototype of the
idealized cognitive model. An extreme example is when a child thinks that the teacher or
daycare worker is the mother of the other children. In that case, we have a radical prototype
effect in which the prototype overshadows the rest of the category.”).
73. Mulder, supra note 38, at 224. Similar perceptions regarding unfairness can
stigmatize the beneficiaries of affirmative action policies, even though the basis and
justification for such preferences may be quite different. See id.
74. See, e.g., MARK RUSS FEDERMAN, RUSS & DAUGHTERS: REFLECTIONS AND RECIPES FROM
THE HOUSE THAT HERRING BUILT 5 (2013) (“‘I am Mr. Russ.’ I expected my pronouncement to
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Equally important, the distorting influence of the “nepotism”
prototype can leave us without a language to talk about family-
business hiring and promotion practices in which the beneficiaries
of kinship preferences are qualified and capable of handling the
responsibility entrusted to them.75 The next Section explores a
variety of real-world situations involving kinship preferences.
2. Access and Apprenticeship
The advantages of insider connections are inescapable in almost
any field of endeavor. At the 2013 MTV awards show, for instance,
Robin Thicke sang his hit song, “Blurred Lines,” while another well-
known singer and actress, Miley Cyrus, danced with him.76 Robin
Thicke’s father, Alan, was an actor best known for his role as the
genial patriarch on a television sitcom.77 Miley Cyrus’s father, Billy
Ray, is a country singer famous for one chart-topping hit.78 Nor are
these kinds of connections unusual; the entertainment industry is
legendary for its incestuousness.79
Such connections, however helpful, are at most an indirect form
of nepotism.80 Neither Alan Thicke nor Billy Ray Cyrus could hand
end any further challenges. It took less than a second for her response. ‘I know you. You’re
not Mistar Russ. Your grandfadder vas Mistar Russ.’”).
75. See Winter, supra note 67, at 1386 (“One consequence of these extreme prototype
effects is that the variants may be left unexpressed by the linguistic conventions of the
culture. Because they have no name, these variants become suppressed aspects of our social
consciousness.” (footnote omitted)). In this vein, one commentator asserts that “[t]he reason
we have tied ourselves in knots around this question [of the meaning of nepotism] is really
quite simple: there is a missing distinction in our lexicon between good nepotism and bad.”
BELLOW, supra note 23, at 15.
76. Jon Caramanica, Stubborn Persistence of Pop, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/arts/music/mtv-video-music-awards-review.html [https://perma.
cc/D2E9-9DB7].
77. See ‘Show Me That Smile Again ...’; Nick at Nite Launches Hit Family Comedy;
Growing Pains Beginning Monday, February 12, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 29, 2007.
78. See Faye Brookman, Hannah Montana Enters Hair Care Segment, WOMEN’S WEAR
DAILY, Feb. 15, 2008.
79. See BELLOW, supra note 23, at 499 (“The multiple couplings, marriages, and
remarriages within this privileged class, resulting in a web of children, stepchildren, half
siblings, uncles and aunts, nieces, nephews, and cousins, have made the Hollywood
community increasingly resemble an inbred occupational caste.”).
80. See id. at 10 (“No one can pick up the phone these days and get their kid a high-paying
job, a record deal, or a spot on the national ticket.”). Yet, “[w]hile not nepotism in the classic
sense, it is rightly called nepotism because it involves exploiting the family name, connections,
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down hit singles like a family heirloom. Their children had to choose
a career path and work for their own success. On the other hand, it
would be naïve to overlook the value of industry connections, access
to voice lessons, the right acting coaches, and the like. Whatever the
talent of Robin Thicke or Miley Cyrus, native or as nurtured, they
enjoyed opportunities not equally available to meritorious outsid-
ers—that is, the talented children of less well-connected parents.81
In family businesses, kinship affords access to a reservoir of
information about a business and associated relationships. Never-
theless, as is true in other professional contexts, the entry of a
younger generation into a family business does not necessarily
signify that kinship has taken precedence over merit. Rather, it may
be the case that the younger generation has developed a sincere
interest in the business, learned the ropes, and, by the time control
passes, qualified for the opportunity.
For example, Arthur Gregg Sulzberger appears well suited for the
role of publisher of the New York Times, which he assumed on Jan-
uary 1, 2018, when his father stepped down after a quarter-century
in the position.82 Mr. Sulzberger is the sixth member of the Ochs-
Sulzberger family to serve as publisher since the Ochs-Sulzberger
family acquired the paper in 1896.83 The Ochs-Sulzberger family
continues to own approximately 91 percent of the paper’s stock and
controls the board.84 However, his appointment was not a foregone
conclusion; Mr. Sulzberger was one of several candidates in con-
tention, and the Times established an independent committee to
make the decision.85
Although Mr. Sulzberger stated in an interview that he “wasn’t
someone who grew up aspiring to become publisher of [t]he New
or wealth. The method may be different, but the result is much the same.” Id. at 14-15.
81. In the fashion industry, the advantages of famous parentage may be even more
powerful. See Vanessa Friedman, Fashion’s Latest Obsession: Chips Off the Celebrity Block,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/fashion/iris-law-evan-ross-
celebrity-children-fashion.html [https://perma.cc/MXG4-TMMR] (“Never before have so many
children of famous parents been so celebrated and rewarded for their lineage, and so willing
to publicly embrace it.”).
82. See Sydney Ember, A.G. Sulzberger, 37, to Take Over as New York Times Publisher,
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York Times,”86 it is clear that he had been groomed for the role. He
worked as a journalist beginning in 2003 and became a reporter for
the Times in 2009, moving up to bureau chief and then deputy pub-
lisher.87 Perhaps most notably, Mr. Sulzberger took on important
responsibility “heading the team that produced [t]he Times’s ‘in-
novation report’ in 2014.”88 The innovation report recommended far-
reaching changes to the paper’s digital offerings.89 As evidenced by
Mr. Sulzberger’s leadership in reviewing the Times’s digital strat-
egy, when changes are needed, family members may have the
ability to force difficult conversations that outsiders might avoid.90
To this extent, Mr. Sulzberger’s family status may enhance his qual-
ifications for the role.
The advantages of upbringing do not always bespeak favoritism.
An older generation may not even intend for younger family mem-
bers to join the business.91 In this regard, the third-generation own-
er of the Russ & Daughters delicatessen in New York recalls that
his early education in the business may have been intended in some
ways to discourage his eventual participation:
Shouting and cursing were the accepted forms of communica-
tion, and there was no attempt to tone it down at all, even in the
presence of a ten-year-old boy. Looking back now, I suspect that
part of the show was for my benefit, with the underlying
message being, “Look, kid, every day is a battle. We enjoy our
battles; it’s all we know. But you don’t need to do this for a
living. You’ll get a good education and won’t have to sell fish.”92




90. For another example, see Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Trump’s White House Is a Family Busi-
ness. That’s Not a Bad Thing., POLITICO MAG. (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.politico.com/maga
zine/story/2017/04/trump-white-house-family-business-215002 [https://perma.cc/24VH-TXE3]
(“By virtue of their close relationship with the president, Jared and Ivanka are able to speak
truth to power without fear of suspect motives. This is a major advantage of family enter-
prises.”).
91. See BELLOW, supra note 23, at 10 (noting that the modern version of nepotism is “not
so much a matter of parents hiring or getting jobs for children as of children choosing to follow
in their parents’ footsteps”).
92. FEDERMAN, supra note 74, at 61-62.
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Whether or not they are encouraged to do so, of course, children may
still gravitate towards the family business.
So far, this Article has argued that kinship preferences in family
businesses do not necessarily signify nepotism. The next Part broad-
ens the Article’s focus and considers the reasons why a business,
family owned or not, might adopt an insider-favoring model of gov-
ernance—and, equally important, why noninsider investors might
accept such an arrangement. Although belief in the entrepreneurial
prowess of business founders could account for initial investment
decisions by outsiders, that explanation has a built-in expiration
date no later than the death or incapacity of the founders. By
contrast, a belief that founders and their appointed heirs will be
faithful stewards provides a more permanent explanation that may
encompass generations of insider control.
II. THE CONTROLLED-COMPANY PUZZLE
The continued success of controlled companies requires an ex-
planation because it contradicts conventional models of corporate
governance. Controlled companies have been characterized as out-
moded “relics of an earlier era.”93 According to this view, which has
been prevalent since the middle of the twentieth century, evolution
toward “widely held distribution of stock ownership and control” is
“inevitable.”94 And yet global practices remain stubbornly resistant
to expert forecasts.95
For example, borrowing a strategy pioneered by family busi-
nesses, Google, Facebook, and Snapchat have all offered low-vote or
no-vote stock to the general public while reserving effective voting
control to company founders.96 These maneuvers are legal under
93. Alex Stewart & Michael A. Hitt, Why Can’t a Family Business Be More Like a
Nonfamily Business? Modes of Professionalization in Family Firms, 25 FAM. BUS. REV. 58, 58
(2012) (citing ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM (1990)). See generally David S. Landes, French Entrepreneurship and Industrial
Growth in the Nineteenth Century, 9 J. ECON. HIST. 45 (1949).
94. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating
the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1647 (2006) (characterizing the argu-
ment as “teleological”); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J.
FIN. 471, 471 (1999) (discussing scholarship on widely held corporations in the last century).
95. See Gilson, supra note 94, at 1643; La Porta et al., supra note 94, at 471.
96. See Smith, supra note 1, at 544-45.
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state corporate law codes that do not require each share to have a
single vote,97 and they have been embraced by investors who are
eager to acquire equity and are apparently undeterred by the lack
of voting influence.98 Thus, unless regulators or stock indices change
the rules to preclude stock-classification, the trend seems likely to
continue.99
Why has insider control proved so durable?100 According to most
law and finance scholars, the answer is plain: controlling owners
enjoy private benefits of control.101 For example, controlling owners
may devise stratagems to expropriate economic resources.102
Alternatively, if the law stands in the way of self-dealing, control-
ling owners might still find intrinsic value in the enhanced social
status and political access that ownership brings.103 Either type of
private benefit can be said to compensate controlling owners for
the risk of an undiversified investment and the cost of monitoring
it.104 Therefore, even if a widely dispersed ownership structure
would be more efficient, controlling owners might prefer the status
quo.105
97. See Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, Why Has There Been So Little Block Hold-
ing in America?, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY
BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 613, 653 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2007).
98. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Shareholders Vote with Their Dollars to Have Less of
a Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook/
shareholders-vote-with-their-dollars-to-have-less-of-a-say.html [https://perma.cc/783C-MJCB].
However, increasing pressure from institutional investors could limit the use of dual stock.
For example, the Investor Stewardship Group, which represents several prominent in-
stitutional investors, has announced new governance principles requiring corporations to
“establish mechanisms to end or phase out controlling structures at the appropriate time.”
Corporate Governance Principles for US Listed Companies, INV. STEWARDSHIP GROUP, https://
isgframework.org/corporate-governance-principles/ [https://perma.cc/ZH7Z-Y4B9].
99. The absence of public regulation may depend, in part, on whether lawyers who draft
governance provisions are able to address investor concerns by tailoring dual-stock structures
to facilitate idiosyncratic entrepreneurial strategies without ignoring legitimate concerns
regarding self-dealing. See generally Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical
and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Stock Structures, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852 (2018).
100. In a controlled structure, “a large blockholder owns a majority or large plurality of a
company’s shares.” Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual
Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow
Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000).
101. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 94, at 1651-52.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1666-67.
104. See id. at 1651-52.
105. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
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In a recent Yale Law Journal article, Professors Zohar Goshen
and Assaf Hamdani questioned the prevailing view and offered a
competing explanation that does not depend on private benefits of
control.106 They argue that founders might instead seek to safeguard
an “idiosyncratic vision[ ].”107 By maintaining control, founders avoid
the risk of being overruled by impatient or skeptical public in-
vestors.108 However, the value of the controlling owners’ entrepre-
neurial strategy affects all shareholders equally—that is, minority
investors receive a pro rata share of any value added as a conse-
quence of the controlling owners’ idiosyncratic vision.109
The various rationales law and finance scholars offer for con-
trolled ownership are not mutually exclusive—any or all of them
could be true—but they lack a broader explanatory framework.110 A
complete account of corporate control must include consideration of
the identity of the controlling owners.111 In this regard, for the vast
majority of controlled companies that are family owned, the family
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 130 (1999) (“[P]arties who participate in
corporate control under an existing structure might have the incentive and power to impede
changes that would reduce their private benefits of control even if the change would be
efficient.”). On the other hand, investors might prefer the level of self-dealing associated with
controlling owners to the agency costs inherent in managerial control. See Sharfman, supra
note 1, at 7 (“[T]he use of the dual class share structure in IPOs is a value-enhancing result
of the bargaining that takes place in the private ordering of corporate governance
arrangements.”) (citing Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for
Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 767 (2017)).
106. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125
YALE L.J. 560, 564-65 (2016).
107. Id. at 617 (“Instead of assuming that controlling owners are expropriators who are
motivated by a desire to consume private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders,
we assert that many controlling owners are instead motivated primarily by a desire to pursue
their idiosyncratic visions that they believe will increase the value of their firms to the benefit
of all shareholders.”).
108. See id. at 565.
109. See id. at 567. If the strategy fails, the loss in business value likewise diminishes the
worth of each shareholder’s investment. Cf. id. However, as long as minority investors hold
a diversified portfolio, the downside risk may be less serious for them than for the controlling
shareholders. See id. at 564.
110. As Ronald Gilson observes, “a more complete explanation for the distribution of
shareholdings must incorporate politics, law, and efficiency, together with the serendipity of
each country’s initial condition.” Gilson, supra note 94, at 1645.
111. Although the identity of controlling owners was not the focus of Gilson’s article, he
cited empirical findings regarding the relative performance of family-controlled businesses.
Id. at 1661. Gilson indicated a need for further research into “the micro-level dynamics” of
controlled structures. Id. at 1678-79.
2019] THE VALUE OF INSIDER CONTROL 911
business literature supplies a plausible framework for analysis. In
particular, the concept of family stewardship illuminates the ways
in which private economic benefits, noneconomic benefits, and an
entrepreneurial vision might coalesce.
A. The Law and Finance of Control
To the extent control rights are commensurate with financial
commitment, those who have control are, in effect, putting all of
their eggs in one basket.112 Their investment is hostage to the
uncertain fortunes of a single enterprise.113 Moreover, the control-
ling owners must share earnings on a pro rata basis with minority
shareholders who do not bear the same burden and may know little
about a company other than its stock price.114 So why is control
appealing? The dominant explanation that law and finance offers for
the persistence of controlled business structures is that they enable
controlling owners to extract private benefits at the expense of other
investors.115
Empirical studies confirm that controlled companies are most
common in legal systems that fail to offer minority investors mean-
ingful protections against expropriation of wealth by controlling
owners.116 For example, controlling owners might cause a controlled
112. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 564. The size of the bet depends on the
strategy for maintaining control. For example, the use of dual classes of stock separates voting
rights from cash-flow rights, allowing founders to maintain control even if outside investors
contribute a majority of the equity capital. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 100, at 297.
Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that dual-voting structures are
potentially more problematic than outright majority ownership as a means of securing control
because dual stock creates a divergence of voting rights and cash-flow rights. See Goshen &
Hamdani, supra note 106, at 592-93 (“In the dispersed-ownership and the dual-class
structures, those with de facto control do not necessarily hold a majority of cash-flow rights.”).
Those who control the company through special, high-voting stock rather than equity have
less skin in the game. See id. Still, controlling owners typically have a far greater economic
stake than would be appropriate for a fully diversified investment strategy. See id. at 564.
113. Most individual investors seek to acquire a diversified portfolio so that they are less
exposed to company-specific or industry-specific risks. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM
WALK DOWN WALL STREET 235-40 (6th ed. 1996) (describing the “modern portfolio theory”).
114. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 567.
115. See Vladimir Atanasov et al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1, 8-9 (2011) (citation
omitted); Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 571.
116. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1145-51
(1998) (studying forty-nine countries and finding that “[t]he results support the idea that
heavily concentrated ownership results from ... weak protection of investors”).
912 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:891
company to engage in transactions with other entities wholly owned
by the controlling owners on terms favorable to the wholly owned
entities.117 Such maneuvers siphon wealth from minority owners
who stand on the losing side of each transaction.118
Yet, an explanation for controlled structures premised on ex-
propriation by the controlling owners accounts for only half of the
puzzle—we still need to ask why outside investors would contribute
capital without adequate safeguards against self-dealing. Unless
outside investors are systematically uninformed, irrational, or
bereft of other options, every increase in the prospects for con-
trolling-owner expropriation should drive down the market price for
controlled-company stock.119 Private benefits of control are illusory
if they are offset by a higher cost of capital. That is, if self-dealing
behavior has already been “priced in,” controlling owners who op-
erate in reasonably efficient capital markets should end up more or
less where they started.120 As a matter of logic, then, expropriation
does not seem to offer a convincing explanation for the prevalence
of controlled business structures.121
117. In the United States, such transactions would be considered self-dealing and subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971).
118. See id. at 720-21.
119. Indeed, even if most investors are uninformed—so-called “noise” traders—an
appropriate discount for the risk of self-dealing should be applied so long as the market
includes investors with access to fundamental information.
120. Selling company stock at a discount in order to preserve the ability to misbehave is
self-defeating from an economic standpoint, much like paying to stock a pond with fish to
increase the chance of catching a fish. In the latter circumstance, at least the enjoyment of
a day spent fishing might be worth the cost.
121. Also, setting aside the controlling owners’ motivation in any particular case, an
increased cost of capital for controlled businesses would seem to put those corporations at a
significant disadvantage to noncontrolled businesses. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 373-74 (11th ed. 2010)
(explaining why someone solicited to invest in a restaurant business controlled by two owner-
managers “might exact a high price for the investment, by demanding a larger portion of the
total equity than would be appropriate in the absence of the possibility of opportunistic
behavior by the owner-managers”). Over time, one might expect those increased costs to
motivate an evolutionary shift toward public corporations with widely dispersed ownership.
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 460 (2001) (“If, as the developing consensus view holds, the standard shareholder-
oriented governance model maximizes corporate value, controlling shareholders who are
motivated chiefly by economic considerations may not wish to retain control of their firms.”).
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Some law and finance scholars contend that controlled structures
are not necessarily detrimental to the interests of outside investors,
even if there is self-dealing by controlling owners.122 Rather, the
desirability of a controlled business-entity structure depends upon
a “tradeoff.”123 With more capital at risk, controlling owners have a
strong incentive to monitor the performance of management, there-
by reducing managerial agency costs to the benefit of all sharehold-
ers.124 The tradeoff is that “[b]ecause controlling shareholders must
bear the direct costs of monitoring, liquidity, and nondiversification
from holding a concentrated position, some private benefits of
control likely are necessary to induce a party to play that role.”125
Thus, the value of the tradeoff depends on the importance of share-
holder monitoring and the amount of implicit compensation de-
manded by the controlling owners.126
Finally, it is worth observing that private benefits of control are
not always financial.127 The availability of nonpecuniary benefits
may explain why concentrated ownership is common even in juris-
dictions that prohibit many forms of economic opportunism.128 Con-
trolling owners might value enhanced community status, political
influence, or other perquisites.129 According to one commentator, it
122. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 785, 790-92 (2003).
123. Id. at 785.
124. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 592-93.
125. Gilson, supra note 94, at 1652.
126. The need for shareholder monitoring will depend on a number of factors, including the
nature and volatility of the business and the existence of other sources of monitoring, such
as “institutional lenders or government regulators.” See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugen-
ics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849, 856 (2012) (citing Edward M. Iacobucci
& George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 552-57
(2007)); see also Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership:
Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1159 (1985) (“The noisier a firm’s environ-
ment, the greater the payoff to owners in maintaining tighter control.”).
127. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 571.
128. See Hans Sjögren, Families Breaking the Business Logic: The Entrepreneurial Spirit
in the Evolution of Swedish Family Dynasties, in THE ENDURANCE OF FAMILY BUSINESSES
111, 113 (Paloma Fernández Pérez & Andrea Colli eds., 2013) (“[T]he Swedish case clearly
shows that family business groups are not just products of emerging market imperfections:
they are also able to start and survive in well-governed and highly industrialized countries
such as Sweden.”).
129. Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 571; see also Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 126,
at 1162 (observing that certain firms have a higher “amenity potential” than others: “Winning
the World Series or believing that one is systematically influencing public opinion plausibly
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follows “[a]lmost tautologically” that “nonpecuniary benefits must
play a prominent role in regimes in which functionally good law
keeps pecuniary private benefits low.”130 Whatever the form of
compensation, in dollars or social status, the prevailing law and
finance explanation assumes that controlling shareholders must be
paid for the risks they bear and the excess value of the monitoring
they provide.131
B. Entrepreneurial Vision
An alternative explanation for the persistence of controlled com-
panies does not assume that controlling owners expropriate private
benefits.132 Goshen and Hamdani argue that founders who refuse to
surrender control may have in mind an entrepreneurial strategy
that, if successful, will benefit both majority and minority invest-
ors.133 By accepting the burden of control, those with confidence in
their own strategy for increasing the value of a business earn the
right to follow that strategy without deviation.134
provides utility to some owners even if profit is reduced from levels otherwise achievable”).
Investors might still worry about the implications of nonmonetary motivations. For example,
three scholars contend that the recent scandal involving Volkswagen’s fraudulent evasion of
vehicle emissions standards may be explained in part by controlling owners’ empire-building
ambitions. See Charles M. Elson et al., The Bug at Volkswagen: Lessons in Co-Determination,
Ownership, and Board Structure, 27 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2015, at 36, 38.
130. Gilson, supra note 94, at 1664.
131. See, e.g., Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 564-65.
132. See id. at 565.
133. Id. at 617 (“Instead of assuming that controlling owners are expropriators who are
motivated by a desire to consume private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders,
we assert that many controlling owners are instead motivated primarily by a desire to pursue
their idiosyncratic visions that they believe will increase the value of their firms to the benefit
of all shareholders.”). Professors Goshen and Hamdani define entrepreneurship broadly to
include not only inventing new products, but also “an innovative method of marketing an
existing product, capitalizing on a new market niche, motivating employees, creating an
optimal capital structure, or utilizing new sources of capital.” Id. at 577 (citing Raghuram G.
Rajan, Presidential Address: The Corporation in Finance, 67 J. FIN. 1173, 1179 (2012)). For
a similarly broad definition, see Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on
Horseback: Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 84 (2008).
134. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 565, 595. Although controlling owners
would prefer to capture all of the economic returns from their labor, the presence of outside
investors may be unavoidable if the founders lack sufficient capital and cannot accomplish
their entrepreneurial vision without taking on additional equity owners. See id. at 578-79.
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For example, in 1903, Henry Ford insisted upon sole control of the
Ford Motor Company, his third entrepreneurial venture.135 He had
learned the hard way that his financial backers could otherwise
thwart his entrepreneurial vision in favor of a safer return on
investment.136 In two previous ventures, coinvestors refused to defer
to Ford’s judgment and insisted that he move from development into
production before he was ready to do so.137 By establishing uncon-
tested control of the Ford Motor Company, Ford was able to take the
time necessary to develop a revolutionary assembly line process and
the design for the Model T automobile.138 His vision paid off
handsomely, and the Ford Motor Company became one the world’s
most successful companies.139
More recently, when Google offered shares to the public, it used
a dual-voting structure to preserve the control of its founders, Ser-
gey Brin and Larry Page, as well as its chairman, Eric Schmidt.140
In a disclosure required by securities law, Google explained that
control was necessary to protect the entrepreneurial vision of its
founders:
We are creating a corporate structure that is designed for
stability over long time horizons. By investing in Google, you are
placing an unusual long-term bet on the team ... and on our
innovative approach.
We want Google to become an important and significant
institution. That takes time, stability and independence. We
bridge the media and technology industries, both of which have
experienced considerable consolidation and attempted hostile
takeovers.
In the transition to public ownership, we have set up a
corporate structure that will make it harder for outside parties
to take over or influence Google. This structure will also make
it easier for our management team to follow [a] long term,
innovative approach ....
135. See M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old
Is New Again, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37, 47-49 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
136. See id. at 46.
137. See id. at 43-44.
138. See id. at 42, 48-49.
139. See id. at 39.
140. Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at iii, 21 (Apr. 29, 2004).
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The main effect of this structure is likely to leave our team ...
with significant control over the company’s decisions and fate, as
Google shares change hands. New investors will fully share in
Google’s long term growth but will have less influence over its
strategic decisions than they would at most public companies.141
Professors Goshen and Hamdani do not purport to demonstrate that
private benefits are irrelevant to the question of control.142 Rather,
they argue that there is a strong, alternative explanation—“control
allows entrepreneurs to pursue business strategies that they believe
will produce above-market returns by securing the ability to imple-
ment their vision in the manner they see fit.”143
Perhaps the most significant limitation of Goshen and Hamdani’s
theory is that it provides a useful explanation for control only so
long as the controlling owners can be said to have a distinctive
entrepreneurial vision. Yet, most controlled businesses have no
mechanism for transitioning toward a widely dispersed model.144 An
investor who accepted Google’s justification regarding the value of
controlled ownership might still be concerned about Google’s lack of
concrete plans for an eventual succession of control.145
For this reason, some commentators have argued that insider
control achieved via dual-stock classification should be subject to
time limits of no more than ten or fifteen years, unless reapproved
141. Id. at iii (emphasis omitted).
142. Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 576 (“We do not argue that control offers no
private benefits .... Nor do we rule out the possibility that ... private benefits will motivate
some controllers to hold a control block.”).
143. Id. at 565.
144. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Lessons from the Viacom Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/business/dealbook/lessons-from-the-viacom-
dispute.html [https://perma.cc/LAZ6-HM4R] (“A public corporation is not necessarily a family
business to be run forever by that founder and his family. And putting an expiration date on
dual-class stock to the extent it is used may be prudent. Other companies should consider
such a mechanism, and prospective shareholders should consider demanding it before they
invest.”).
145. A company’s fundamental value can be described as its future cash flow reduced to
present value. Sylvain Marsat & Benjamin Williams, Does Price Influence Assessment of
Fundamental Value? Experimental Evidence, 14 J. BEHAV. FIN. 268, 268 (2013). Thus, storm
clouds on the horizon—even the far-distant horizon—would seem to be relevant to the pricing
of the company’s stock. See id. Perhaps, though, concerns about succession of control in a
high-tech company such as Google are too far away to affect stock price, given the volatility
in an industry in which there is rarely, if ever, a comfortable distance between the cutting
edge and obsolescence.
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by independent directors.146 Consistent with this argument, at least
one company has adopted a sunset provision premised on the dimin-
ishing value of insider control once the distinctive entrepreneurial
vision of the founder is no longer a factor.147 Facebook recently ad-
justed its corporate structure to provide for a transition to widely
dispersed ownership once Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, no
longer plays an active role in management:
[T]he new automatic conversion triggers ... provide for the un-
winding of the multi-class stock structure and the relinquish-
ment of Mr. Zuckerberg’s majority voting control of us in certain
circumstances .... The Special Committee and the board of di-
rectors believe that without these new terms (i.e., if Mr. Zucker-
berg or his descendants could maintain majority voting control
indefinitely after he is no longer in a leadership role at the com-
pany, which is currently the case), it could be exceedingly
difficult to attract and retain a high-quality replacement for Mr.
Zuckerberg. These new terms thus ensure that we will not
remain a founder-controlled company after we cease to be a
founder-led company.148
While Facebook values Zuckerberg’s leadership, just as Google
relies upon its founders,149 Facebook’s structure guarantees that
Zuckerberg cannot transition control to a family heir.150 Facebook’s
time-limited approach to control is appropriate assuming that the
justification for control depends on the founder’s idiosyncratic
entrepreneurial vision.151 Investors are invited to surrender voting
protections ordinarily applicable to a publicly traded corporation in
order to gain the alleged benefits of the founder’s entrepreneurial
vision.152 In doing so, however, they are not asked to accept the vi-
cissitudes of permanent family ownership.153
146. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 1, at 590.
147. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
148. Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Form DEF 14A), at 62 (June 2, 2016) (Mitigating Succession Risk).
149. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
151. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 617.
152. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
153. See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 1, at 590 (“[A]s time passes, the potential costs of
a dual-class structure tend to increase while the potential benefits tend to erode.”).
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C. Stewardship
So far, this Part has canvassed several law and finance explana-
tions for control: expropriation of private financial benefits, access
to the perquisites of control, and idiosyncratic entrepreneurial vi-
sion. This Section argues that financial explanations do not fully
account for the motivations of controlling owners, especially in
family businesses. What is missing is stewardship—the sense that
control comes with obligations to the business, to one’s own family,
to employees, and to community.
Financial explanations of behavior presume that self-interest
alone is what counts—hence the widely accepted view that the
greater costs and risks borne by controlling owners must be
compensated with private benefits.154 Even Professors Goshen and
Hamdani accept that founders pursue an entrepreneurial vision
because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that they will be able to
maximize the value of the business.155 But when individuals are
part of institutions they have reason to care about, they do not
necessarily make choices based solely on self-interest.156 Indeed,
there is evidence that family owners sometimes engage in “prop-
ping” behavior—devoting their own resources to sustain the via-
bility of a business in a downturn, although the benefit of that
investment will be shared with public investors.157
The expectation of stewardship may explain the appeal of con-
trolled companies to outside investors, notwithstanding the con-
cerns raised by law and finance scholars. As one commentator
explained:
If you buy New York Times stock, you are buying into the notion
that you’ll let the family run the show, as it has done for more
154. See Gilson, supra note 94, at 1652.
155. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 617.
156. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, How Punch Protected the Times, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/opinion/nocera-how-punch-protected-the-times.html
[https://perma.cc/M577-TL3G] (“As many other well-known newspaper families have
abandoned the business—most recently, the Bancrofts of Dow Jones and [t]he Wall Street
Journal—the Sulzbergers have remained steadfast in their belief that they were put on this
earth to preserve and protect [t]he New York Times.”).
157. See Villalonga & Amit, supra note 9, at 865 (“[C]ontrolling shareholders, such as fam-
ilies, may use their private funds to ‘prop up’ (i.e., provide temporary support) to financially
troubled firms, thereby benefiting minority shareholders in those companies.”).
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than a century. And the Sulzbergers will put [t]he Times’s
journalism ahead of all else, because that is what is in the
family’s DNA.158
Notably, stewardship implies a long-term relationship. Unlike Face-
book,159 most controlled companies do plan for a succession of control
from generation to generation.160 For this reason, the owners typ-
ically see themselves as stewards of the business enterprise.161
According to one recent study, public corporations run by their
founders or by family owners reflect the values of their controlling
owners.162 The study suggests that founders and family owners are
more inclined to give weight to the interests of all stakeholders.163
Stewardship can affect business strategy in several important
respects. First, because family business owners tend to take a
longer-term view, they often find it more important to avoid the risk
of “busts” than to optimize the profitability of “booms.”164 Thus,
family owners “exhibit much care about continuity, community and
connection: specifically, about the long term preservation and
nurturing of their business and its markets.”165 Other types of
158. Nocera, supra note 156.
159. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
160. See Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, The Role of Family in Family Firms, 20
J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74 (2006) (“Family firms are characterized by a concentration of
ownership, control and often key management positions among family members, even after
the retirement of the firms’ founders.”); Means, supra note 12, at 939 (“Typically, owners seek
to increase family wealth, to provide employment for family members, and, ultimately, to
transfer control to a new generation of family owners.”).
161. Danny Miller et al., Stewardship vs. Stagnation: An Empirical Comparison of Small
Family and Non-Family Businesses, 45 J. MGMT. STUD. 51, 51-52 (2008) (In addition to
economic dependence, “scholars have argued that there can be significant socio-emotional
attachments of family managers to their business, which comes to satisfy their needs both for
security, as well as for social contribution, sharing, belonging, and even standing within the
family.”).
162. See Mullins & Schoar, supra note 7, at 24-25 (reporting survey results of more than
800 CEOs). The authors also included nonfamily businesses in their study and found that:
“Founders and CEOs related to the firm’s founder are more likely to embrace a stakeholder
view of management and feel less responsibility towards their shareholders, instead
prioritizing employees and creditors.” Id. at 25.
163. See id. at 26.
164. See Nocera, supra note 156 (“As a red-blooded capitalist, I understand why dual
classes of stock are frowned upon.... It is likely that Times Company stock is lower than it
would be if shareholders knew they could ‘put it in play,’ as they say on Wall Street.”).
165. Miller et al., supra note 161, at 73; see also Danny Miller et al., Family Ownership and
Acquisition Behavior in Publicly-Traded Companies, 31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 201, 202 (2010)
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entrepreneurs are more likely to adopt “strategies of rapid growth
through quick expansion rather than more gradual means such as
substantive innovation, social contribution or reputation build-
ing.”166
Second, family-business owners often seek “to ‘enlarge’ the family
concept sufficiently” to encompass workers and other important
stakeholders.167 The desire to include others within the family’s
ambit may reflect a perceived ethical obligation, but it also can
strengthen the business. For example, family-business owners en-
gender loyalty by protecting workers even when it would be eco-
nomically rational to engage in layoffs and outsourcing to reduce
labor costs.168 In the short term, these commitments may come at
the expense of profitability.169 However, while corporate generosity
might reduce revenue, the good will engendered gives family-
controlled businesses better odds of weathering unforeseen chal-
lenges.170 The decision by family owners “[t]o share some benefits
(“[F]amily owners, preoccupied with corporate longevity, are said to pursue strategies of
‘continuity’ that avoid potentially destabilizing acquisitions and build enduring relationships
with stakeholders inside and outside the firm to sustain the business and reduce risk.”).
166. Miller et al., supra note 161, at 54.
167. Andrea Colli, Risk, Uncertainty, and Family Ownership, in THE ENDURANCE OF
FAMILY BUSINESSES, supra note 128, at 85, 104. Although it involved intrafamily conflict, the
recent boycott by employees and customers of the Market Basket grocery store chain in favor
of their deposed CEO, Arthur T. Demoulas, showed how strong the ties of loyalty can
be—employees were willing to risk their jobs in support of a CEO who, in their view, treated
them like family. Jana Kasperkevic, Market Basket’s Popular CEO Arthur T Goes Rogue and
Wins—Now What?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2014, 5:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/money/
us-money-blog/2014/aug/28/market-basket-ceo-rogue-now-what [https://perma.cc/YJW2-2KJ5];
Alana Semuels, Power to the Workers: How Grocery Chain Employees Saved Beloved CEO,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
market-basket-ceo-arthur-t-demoulas-20140828-story.html# [https://perma.cc/K2QJ-K5BY].
168. See Timothy G. Habbershon & Mary L. Williams, A Resource-Based Framework for
Assessing the Strategic Advantages of Family Firms, 12 FAM. BUS. REV. 1, 4 (1999) (“Family
firms have been described as having a unique working environment that fosters a family-
oriented workplace and inspires greater employee care and loyalty.”). For a case study, see
BETH MACY, FACTORY MAN (2014).
169. See Pascual Berrone et al., Family-Controlled Firms and Stakeholder Management:
A Socioemotional Wealth Preservation Perspective, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY
BUSINESS 179, 191 (Leif Melin et al. eds., 2014).
170. See id.; Colli, supra note 167, at 103. To this end, family leaders may also “nurture
employees who contribute to corporate health by creating a community culture populated by
motivated, well-trained and loyal staff” and “create strong connections with outside
stakeholders, especially customers who can sustain the business in times of trouble.” Miller
et al., supra note 161, at 52.
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[is] thus a way of safeguarding the survival of the company, as well
as of enhancing the standing of the family within the community.”171
Third, because of their identification with the business, family
owners may be more willing than nonfamily owners to accept
personal financial risk: “[T]he owners and managers of family
businesses have an unusual amount at stake because of the deep
connections between the family and the business.”172 In this respect,
stewardship theory suggests that the family owners’ commitment to
the business may be stronger than economic analysis would
otherwise predict.173
An example may help clarify the distinction between stewardship
and other explanations for insider control. While the early years of
the Ford Motor Company illustrate the potential virtues of idiosyn-
cratic, entrepreneurial vision,174 the company today better repre-
sents the value of stewardship. That is, Goshen and Hamdani’s
theory illuminates Henry Ford’s reasons for seeking control more
than a century ago,175 but it falters as an explanation for the Ford
family’s continuing control of the Ford Motor Company.176 Outside
investors are unlikely to credit the Ford family with having in-
herited superior judgment relevant to corporate entrepreneurship,
“the processes by which an established organization creates new
organizations, initiates strategic renewal, and innovates within the
organization.”177
171. Colli, supra note 167, at 103. Efforts by family firms to integrate themselves into the
community “are abundant almost everywhere in Europe and in the industrialized world in
general.” Id.
172. Miller et al., supra note 161, at 51. See generally James H. Davis et al., Toward a
Stewardship Theory of Management, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20 (1997) (distinguishing
stewardship from other theories of managerial behavior).
173. Colli, supra note 167, at 95 (“[Family owners] are often not acting on the basis of
personal self-interest, but for the benefit of the organization and of its stakeholders.”).
174. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
175. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 106, at 617.
176. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
177. Alexander McKelvie et al., Corporate Entrepreneurship in Family Businesses: Past
Contributions and Future Opportunities, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY BUSINESS, supra
note 169, at 340, 340. To be clear, I do not mean to question the competence of the current
generation of Ford leadership or its commitment to entrepreneurship. See, e.g., Neal E.
Boudette, Ford Motor Plans Ride-Hailing Service with Fleet of Driverless Cars by 2021, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2016, at B2; Will Oremus, Ford Wants to Be the Ford of Driverless Cars,
SLATE (Aug. 16, 2016, 2:28 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2016/08/ford-says-it-will-mass-
produce-a-driverless-car-by-2021.html [https://perma.cc/WAF4-SLHG] (“Ford’s goal is to
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Nevertheless, outside investors might value the family’s evident
sense of mission and long-term perspective. During the financial
crisis of 2008, Ford was the only U.S. car company to turn down a
bailout—its executive chairman at the time was the great-grandson
of Henry Ford, and the company had taken a more conservative
strategy than its rivals to amass financial resources in case of an
unexpected downturn.178 Also, the family was willing to put its own
capital on the line to help the corporation pull through the crisis and
emerge in a stronger competitive position.179 From the standpoint of
outside investors, the sincere commitment of controlling owners to
the long-term success of the company may be more important than
the content of their entrepreneurial vision. Longstanding, visible
family ownership is one way of signaling that commitment.180
The concept of stewardship is most applicable to family busi-
nesses but may also explain other forms of controlling ownership.
When controlling owners have reason to identify with the long-term
interests of the business, the benefits of stewardship can be
disaggregated from the specific characteristics of family ownership.
reprise its role in the original automotive revolution: It doesn’t want to be the company that
invents driverless cars, but the one that brings them to the masses.”).
178. Erik Cassano, How Bill Ford Jr. Led Ford Motor Co. Through the Recession, SMART
BUS. MAG. (Mar. 1, 2011, 7:56 PM), http://www.sbnonline.com/article/bill-ford-jr-on-the-future-
of-his-brand-the-business/ [https://perma.cc/S4TJ-RTZ8].
179. See id. (“The patience of the Ford family is being rewarded. Not only did the company
emerge from the financial crisis without the need for federal money, but Ford says the
company’s debt is being paid off much faster than either the company’s leaders or industry
analysts anticipated.”). See generally MATTHIAS HOLWEG & NICK OLIVER, CRISIS, RESILIENCE
AND SURVIVAL: LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL AUTO INDUSTRY 278 (2016) (“[Ford] use[s] closely
held shares as a proxy for a long-term commitment to the firm, likely to be manifested as a
propensity to provide support in the face of financial and other adversity.”).
180. See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 156:
The bet Punch Sulzberger made his whole career is that people wanted—and
would pay for—great journalism. Today, despite an uncertain future, his heirs
[at the New York Times] are making the same bet. The protection afforded them
by the dual-class structure has allowed the current chairman, Arthur Sulzberger
Jr., and the rest of the family to take the long view without worrying about cor-
porate raiders or hedge fund managers.
Empirical studies focused on economic metrics indicate that family firms outperform non-
family firms but that “the performance of family firms is only better in firms in which the
family is still active, either on the executive or the supervisory board.” Christian Andres,
Large Shareholders and Firm Performance—An Empirical Examination of Founding-Family
Ownership, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 431, 432 (2008).
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The viability of stewardship as an explanation for nonfamily
control has important implications for corporate governance debates
regarding dual-stock classification. In recent years, well-known
technology companies have made the case that their founding
owners should retain control in order to safeguard the business
mission.181 To accomplish this objective, these companies have used
the dual-stock strategies developed by family businesses such as the
New York Times.182
Although technology company founders base the appeal for
continuing control on their proven entrepreneurial skills and
instincts rather than the noblesse oblige of family ownership,183
investors may conclude (for better or worse) that the founders will
identify deeply with the companies they have worked so hard to
build. It does not require a large stretch of the imagination to
understand why business owners, whose public prominence is bound
up in the technologies they have created, might care about how
those technologies are used and whether they serve the public
interest.184
On the other hand, regulators might be skeptical of the value of
stewardship, especially when nonfamily owners take measures to
preserve their control. These concerns are likely to be heightened
when the companies at issue are significant to the economy and to
everyday life for millions of people. Google, Facebook, and Snapchat
all belong in that category of significance. If insider control reduces
value because insiders expropriate private benefits for themselves,
181. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
182. See Nocera, supra note 156:
Since the 1950s, the company had given stock to favored employees and others,
stock that could be bought and sold but had no voting rights. The solution was
to give that stock—Class A shares, they were called—some voting rights, but not
enough to threaten the family’s control. The Class B shares, held largely in a
family trust, still gave the Sulzbergers the power to elect around 70 percent of
the board.
183. See, e.g., supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
184. It is, of course, possible for business owners to seek to achieve public benefit and
family recognition using the wealth generated by a family business, even if the business itself
operates without concern for the harms it creates. For a stark recent example of the
divergence between business practices and philanthropic ambitions, see Patrick Radden
Keefe, Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2017, at 34 (uncovering the relationship
between the Sackler family’s wealth, which was largely generated from the unscrupulous
marketing of OxyContin, and the family’s lavish support of the arts).
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then dual-stock classification is undesirable because it enables
founders to offer stock to the public markets without relinquishing
control.185 Accordingly, concerned investor advocates, regulators,
and lawmakers have sought to apply financial penalties to deter
these types of governance structures.186
For example, Senator Elizabeth Warren has asked the “NYSE
and NASDAQ to declare companies ineligible for an initial listing if
they have unequal voting rights, and to prohibit already listed
companies from issuing additional classes of common stock with
unequal voting rights.”187 The lobbying efforts against controlled
companies have begun to bear fruit: notably, Snapchat’s 2017 initial
public offering did not provide public investors with voting rights,
and, in response, “S&P excluded it from its ubiquitous S&P 500
Index.”188
III. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF CONTROLLING OWNERS
Concerns about abuses of insider control are legitimate, but
regulations that restrict insider control also diminish the prospects
for stewardship. This Part argues that the fiduciary obligations
owed by controlling owners provide a more balanced basis for
regulation than across-the-board regulatory restrictions of the sort
favored by Professors Bebchuk and Kastiel, Senator Warren, and
other concerned critics.189 To the extent well-informed investors are
willing to invest in controlled companies because they believe the
benefits outweigh the costs, the government and stock exchange
should respect those investment decisions.190 Moreover, regulations
185. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 1, at 626.
187. Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Senator Elizabeth Warren Urges NYSE, NASDAQ
to Propose Rules Requiring “One Share, One Vote” Structures (June 5, 2013) (reporting
contents of letter sent to the NYSE and NASDAQ). According to Senator Warren, “[l]ong-term
investors will have limited recourse in holding management and the board accountable if the
company heads in a wrong direction.” Id.
188. Smith, supra note 1, at 543-44.
189. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
190. In this regard, Bernard Sharfman argues that “it is an overreach for academics and
shareholder activists to dictate to sophisticated capital market participants—the ones who
actually take the financial risk of investing in IPOs (including those with dual class share
structures)—how to structure corporate governance arrangements.” Sharfman, supra note 1,
at 32.
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that make it harder for businesses to select and adhere to idiosyn-
cratic strategies are unlikely to serve the broader goals of progres-
sive critics.191 The stewardship that insider control fosters, however
imperfectly, can serve as a hedge against a monolithic corporate
system of profit maximization that neglects other kinds of social
value.
A. The Availability of Judicial Oversight
Ordinarily, shareholders owe no fiduciary duties to other
shareholders or to the corporation, and are free to act in their own
self-interest, regardless of the possible consequences for other
constituencies.192 In controlled companies, the situation is different
for two reasons. First, to the extent controlling owners hold board
positions or senior managerial roles, the controlling owners owe the
same fiduciary duties as any other board member or manager when
acting in that capacity.193 Second, even if controlling owners act
indirectly by appointing board members to implement their plans,
the law imposes fiduciary duties commensurate with their effective
control of corporate decision making.194
191. A similar dynamic is at play in the nascent law of social enterprise; the business
structures that create managerial flexibility also leave room for managers to depart from the
mission without full accountability. For an assessment of social enterprise’s promise and
challenges, see THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW (Benjamin Means &
Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3280370
[https://perma.cc/AW4Y-TMNX].
192. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 65 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Stockholders
in Delaware corporations have a right to control and vote their shares in their own interest.”
(quoting Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987))).
193. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 45 (3d Cir. 1947) (“[T]here is a radical
difference when a stockholder is voting strictly as a stockholder and when voting as a director;
that when voting ... as a director he represents all the stockholders in the capacity of a trustee
for them and cannot use his office as a director for his personal benefit at the expense of the
stockholders.” (citing Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1917))).
194. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. (In re Newmont Mining Corp.
S’holders Litig.), 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (“[A] shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only
if it owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the
corporation.” (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985)));
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-20 (Del. 1971) (applying fiduciary duties to a
parent corporation that held 97 percent of the stock of its subsidiary and appointed its board);
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 336 (2002) (arguing that
controlling shareholder liability is premised on agency principles because the controlling
shareholder has the power to elect the board and is therefore responsible for it).
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Accordingly, across all forms of business association, the fiducia-
ry duties of care and loyalty are available to regulate insider
control.195 In closely held businesses, the doctrine of minority share-
holder oppression may provide further protection for noncontrolling
owners.196 Unlike regulations that might, for example, limit insider
control by imposing sunset provisions197 or by preventing companies
with unequal classes of stock from listing on stock exchanges or
indices,198 the availability of judicial monitoring should not impede
owners from serving as stewards. Unless noncontrolling sharehold-
ers can specifically allege breaches of the duty of care or loyalty, the
board has “virtually unconstrained freedom to exercise business
judgment.”199 As discussed below, fiduciary duties require a well-
informed decision-making process and prevent controlling owners
from expropriating the value of a business for their own benefit, but
leave ample room for discretionary choices that can serve the in-
terests of multiple corporate constituencies.200
B. The Duty of Care
The fiduciary duty of care matters because insider control is no
guarantor of competent management, and noncontrolling share-
holders lack the voting power to make necessary changes. For
example, according to a common, three-generation schema of family
businesses, entrepreneurial ambition is too often confined to the
first generation of ownership.201 As one commentator assessed the
195. The strength of the respective fiduciary duties varies depending on the form of
business association and state law, and may be more or less subject to private ordering. For
simplicity’s sake, this Article focuses largely on Delaware. Delaware is by far the most
important jurisdiction for corporate law. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the
Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 136 (2004)
(“Delaware’s dominance is staggering. Over 300,000 companies are incorporated there,
including nearly three hundred of the Fortune 500.”).
196. See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority
Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1220 (2009) (describing
and critiquing current judicial approaches to resolving problems of shareholder oppression).
197. See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 1, at 626.
198. See, e.g., Press Release, Warren, supra note 187.
199. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 194, at 251.
200. For a detailed analysis of the business judgment rule and the tradeoff between
managerial discretion and equity, see Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business
Judgment Rule, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 27 (2017).
201. See, e.g., Sjögren, supra note 128, at 111-12 (“The founder builds up his enterprise,
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problem, “[c]onservatism prevails, and growth ambitions and
opportunities are curtailed.”202 According to this “stagnation per-
spective,” “resource shortages, family conflicts and succession
difficulties aggravate the situation, compromising the very longevity
of the firm.”203 When they overstay their welcome, controlling
owners can sabotage a business notwithstanding the strength of
their personal attachments.204
In many family businesses, the transition of control across
generations poses the greatest risk to stability and growth.205 First,
there is the question whether the next generation of family owners
will have the talent and motivation to build on what earlier
generations established.206 Second, an orderly, timely transition of
power requires advance planning—yet, founders too often defer the
unpleasant consideration of their own mortality and resist surren-
dering control when, in their view, that means a loss of individual
identity and a diminishment of status within the family.207
Properly understood, the duty of care addresses these concerns by
requiring managers and, by extension, controlling owners to act
with reasonable care.208 For example, business succession is a high
often on the basis of a clever innovation; the second generation administers the firm without
further innovations; and the third generation concentrates on interests other than those of
the founder, including cutting corners, self-indulgent luxurious living, and the fortune is thus
dissipated.”). Although this life cycle may reduce economic inequality in society by limiting
the temporal scope of family fortunes, a predictable decline in managerial competence would
surely be of concern to outside investors. See Means, supra note 12, at 955, 958-59 (“When a
family falters, the markets will wrest control away, one way or another.”).
202. Miller et al., supra note 161, at 52 (describing this view as the “stagnation per-
spective”).
203. Id.
204. The continued existence of family-controlled companies does not rebut the argument.
See id. After all, new ventures will arise to replace those that fail. See generally Sjögren, supra
note 128, at 112 (including a discussion of “emerging dynasties”). As a consequence, family-
controlled companies could represent a significant percentage of the overall economy whether
or not individual companies survive multiple generations of ownership. See Means, supra note
12, at 939-40.
205. See Means, supra note 8, at 1189.
206. See supra note 201.
207. See Means, supra note 8, at 1215.
208. In Delaware, directors must “use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and
prudent men would use in similar circumstances.” Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188
A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). The Model Business Corporation Act similarly states that directors
should act “with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate
under similar circumstances.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2016).
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priority for any business dependent on key managerial employees.209
Failure to establish a succession plan should be a per se violation of
the duty of care.210 Nor does nepotism satisfy the duty of care;
although kinship preferences are part and parcel of family owner-
ship, those in control of a business must make reasonable inquiry
into the qualifications of designated successors.211 To the extent
family members participate in management, therefore, a succession
plan should establish criteria to ensure that only well-qualified
family members will be eligible for high-level managerial positions.
For these reasons, invocation of the duty of care could help minority
investors insist that controlled companies engage in proper succes-
sion planning and, if necessary, would provide grounds for obtaining
injunctive relief.212
Although some commentators might object that the duty of care
is toothless in controlled companies because boards lack indepen-
dence, the presence of fiduciary obligations can still shape behavior.
As an initial matter, one cannot presume that directors will violate
their fiduciary obligations in order to seek reappointment in the
future, or out of misplaced loyalty to those who appoint them.213
209. For example, at a recent shareholders meeting, Apple’s CEO explained “that one of
his most important roles as CEO is properly ‘passing the baton’ to a new leader” and that
“[e]very Apple board meeting in recent years has had succession planning on the agenda for
all key executive roles.” Mark Gurman, Apple CEO Sees Dividend Hikes, Calls Succession a
Priority, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Feb. 13, 2018, 3:02 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-02-13/apple-ceo-sees-dividend-hikes-calls-succession-a-priority [https://perma.cc/
WQX5-XAFW].
210. See generally Means, supra note 8, at 1231 (“Effective planning can reduce the
likelihood of conflict in a family business and provide nondestructive solutions for conflicts
that do arise. However, family businesses often fail to consider issues of succession and other
potential flash points.... Consequently, courts have an important role to play in resolving
disputes that cannot be settled amicably by the parties.”).
211. Compare supra note 201, with supra note 209.
212. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001). Litigation costs could pose
a practical barrier to maintaining duty of care lawsuits. Ordinarily, shareholders would not
be entitled to monetary damages. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91-92 (Del.
2001). Although the affirmative standard requires due care, directors are only liable for gross
negligence. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). Moreover, most juris-
dictions permit corporations to exculpate directors from monetary damages for breaches of the
duty of care. See, e.g., Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90.
213. For example, in a bitter takeover battle between Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
(“Air Products”) and Airgas, Inc. (“Airgas”), nominees to the Airgas board appointed by Air
Products ultimately endorsed the defensive measures put in place by the Airgas management
team. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 122 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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Equally important, if the board lacks independence because of a
controlling shareholder, then the board can enforce the fiduciary
duties against the shareholder if there is self-dealing.214
It may be that courts should apply closer scrutiny to ensure that
the duty of care has been met in cases involving insider control. If
all parties saw judicial relief as a realistic option, controlled com-
panies would have reason to adopt succession plans. When neces-
sary, shareholders could use the prospect of litigation to force
corporations to engage in meaningful succession planning or to
adjust outdated plans that might already exist.215
Courts may not be well-positioned to judge the merits of a
particular succession plan, but they can evaluate the adequacy of
the underlying process.216 Poorly designed succession plans can put
a business at risk.217 For example, a dual-class stock scheme adopt-
ed in 1990 allowed Sumner Redstone to retain complete control of
Viacom, even a quarter century after serious questions regarding
his mental competence arose.218 This arrangement should have been
subject to a fiduciary challenge, either by Viacom’s board or by
minority shareholders.219 Although Redstone built Viacom “into a
$40 billion entertainment empire that encompasses the Paramount
movie studio and the CBS, MTV, and Showtime television net-
works,”220 his faculties as of 2016 were so diminished that it was not
clear whether he was still capable of basic cognitive functioning.221
Nevertheless, one commentator concluded that the family’s effective
control was so absolute that board resistance to the family’s
directives was likely an exercise in futility without any clear legal
basis.222 It may well be true that Redstone and his family had total
214. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 194, at 336.
215. See supra notes 210, 212 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90-91 (discussing deference for business
decisions and the opportunity for court assessment of fairness).
217. See Miller et al., supra note 161, at 52.
218. Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 1, at 587-88, 587 n.1 (“Sumner Redstone indirectly
controls Viacom through National Amusements, Inc. ... while holding only 8 [percent] of
Viacom’s equity capital.” (citing Viacom Inc., Proxy Statement pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form DEF 14A), at 22 (Dec. 16, 2016))).
219. See generally id. (noting the powerlessness of investors).
220. Id. at 587.
221. Sydney Ember, “He Can’t Speak,” Lawyer Says as Redstone Word War Rages, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2016, at B3.
222. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Viacom Has Few Options for Fighting National
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control over Viacom, but, regardless of whether they voted directly
or through other controlled companies or trusts, the Redstones’
exercise of that power was subject to fiduciary constraints that
appear to have been ignored.223
The duty of care does not preclude family-business succession or
other similar exercises of insider prerogative; it simply requires an
appropriate process before decisions are made.224 Consider in this
regard the way the New York Times selected its most recent pub-
lisher.225 Even though there was a strong presumption in favor of
the Ochs-Sulzberger family, the succession decision was delegated
to an independent committee.226 The newspaper is publicly held and
proceeded in apparent recognition of the fact that there were non-
family equity investors with financial interests at stake.227 More-
over, the New York Times has long served nationally and perhaps
internationally as the paper of record.228 As the controlling family
surely understood, an improperly handled transition could damage
the paper’s ability to fulfill this vital role to the detriment of its
shareholders, the journalists who work for it, and the general public
who rely on its integrity.229 Indeed, abiding by the duty of care is
part of what it means to be a steward. The applicable fiduciary
standard reflects and reinforces benign explanations for insider
control.
Amusements, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/business/
dealbook/viacom-has-few-options-for-fighting-national-amusements.html [https://perma.cc/
AG92-DGXA] (noting Viacom directors’ “shrill” response to Sumner Redstone’s daughter
asserting control of the company, and the CEO’s “seeming incapability of letting go”).
223. See id.; see also supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the voting structure
of Viacom).
224. See supra note 208.
225. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
226. See Ember, supra note 82.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. Similar concerns were raised when the Bancroft family sold its stake in the
Wall Street Journal to Rupert Murdoch. See Richard Pérez-Peña & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Dow
Jones Deal Gives Murdoch a Coveted Prize, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2007), https://www.nytimes.
com/2007/08/01/business/media/01dow.html?mtrref=search.yahoo.com [https://perma.cc/3F5F-
GVZP]. Although many of Murdoch’s own businesses are family controlled, and so it could be
said that the Wall Street Journal remains in family hands, see Lachlan Murdoch to Claim
Family Empire, BBC NEWS (May 17, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44149076
[https:// perma.cc/B8N5-LMMG], it is now arguably harnessed to a media empire in which
journalism plays only a part alongside entertainment properties and apparent political
ambitions.
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C. The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty offers further protection against abuses of
control. As a general matter, managerial decisions are protected
from substantive judicial review by what is known as the “business
judgment rule.”230 However, courts apply heightened scrutiny to
challenged transactions if plaintiffs can properly allege that con-
trolling shareholders or directors have a conflict of interest that
calls their loyalty into question.231 Such conflicts include “trans-
actions with close relatives of managers or with companies owned
by their families.”232
For example, in one famous case, the corporation hired the
spouse of a board member to sing as part of the corporation’s new
advertising campaign.233 Shareholders challenged the use of cor-
porate funds as an improper transfer in violation of the duty of
loyalty.234 The court approved the hiring decision, but only after
closely scrutinizing it to ensure that the substantive terms were
entirely fair to the corporation.235
The duty of loyalty supplements the duty of care and provides
another mechanism for regulating controlling shareholders in
conflict-of-interest transactions.236 Thus, regardless of the voting
power of a controlling owner, business succession should not re-
ceive business judgment rule deference when controlling owners
rely upon kinship preferences. Although family succession may
survive enhanced scrutiny, the perpetuation of family ownership
must be justified.237 To avoid the prospect of judicial scrutiny after
the fact, controlling owners may choose to disclose the existence of
the conflict and seek ratification by independent board members or
shareholders.
230. See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 41 (2013) (“In the
United States, the ‘business judgment rule’ bestows significant discretion to corporate man-
agers and directors to exercise independent decision-making authority on a wide range of
decisions under ordinary circumstances.”).
231. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994).
232. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 153 (2d ed. 2009).
233. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 7 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
234. Id. at 4.
235. See id. at 9-10.
236. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1079, 1082 (Del. 2001) (recognizing
separate claims for breach of the duty of loyalty and breach of the duty of care).
237. See, e.g., supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
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The safeguard provided by the duty of loyalty is important be-
cause there is always the risk that controlling owners will take
advantage of their position to achieve private benefits of control.238
In the context of family ownership, family members who are em-
ployed by a family business sometimes earn salaries greater than
they could expect elsewhere, dividends can be issued to meet the
needs of family members, and business ownership may come with
meaningful nonpecuniary benefits for the controlling family.239
Accordingly,
To the extent that the controlling shareholder or her heirs wish
to go on directly managing the company, there may be a
powerful inclination to overinvest in the company’s existing
businesses—those with which the family manager is more
comfortable—even though other opportunities that require
different managerial skills may offer higher returns.240
The duty of loyalty comes into play when a controlling owner’s
choices benefit insiders at the expense of other constituencies.241
However, the duty of loyalty should constrain managerial dis-
cretion principally when those in control stand on both sides of a
transaction. Taken too far, the duty of loyalty could be used to
blanch stewardship of its ameliorative powers and to enshrine
profit-maximization at the expense of other corporate objectives.242
Applied in this fashion, the duty of loyalty would undermine the
business judgment rule and prevent controlling owners from
238. See Means, supra note 12, at 959. To be clear, the existence of self-interested moti-
vation does not mean that family owners will adopt entrepreneurial strategies that fail to
produce value for other investors. See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text. Nor should
successful stewardship require family owners to act with total selflessness. See, e.g., supra
notes 100-09 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding the potential for misalignment, some
scholars conclude that “family ownership, instead of exacerbating the agency costs with
minority-equity claimants, appears to reduce conflicts of interest.” Ronald C. Anderson &
David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage,
46 J.L. & ECON. 653, 655-56 (2003).
239. See, e.g., supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
240. Gilson, supra note 94, at 1667.
241. See, e.g., Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1083-85 (rejecting the duty of loyalty claim because
“the facts alleged in the complaint [did] not state a cognizable claim that the directors acted
in their own personal interests rather than in the best interests of the stockholders”).
242. See id. (“[T]he board must perform its fiduciary duties in the service of a specific
objective: maximizing the sale price of the enterprise.”).
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exercising their discretion to define business objectives and to
formulate a strategy to achieve them.243
A recent case involving craigslist, Incorporated, a company
controlled by its founders, James Buckmaster and Craig Newmark,
illustrates the danger of an overly broad interpretation of the duty
of loyalty.244 The court rejected as improper craigslist’s commitment
to serving as a community resource for online classified advertise-
ments.245 Per longstanding practice, craigslist earned money from
“online job postings in certain cities and apartment listings in New
York City” and otherwise made its website available for free.246 The
court acknowledged that craigslist’s founders were “committed to
this community-service approach to doing business.”247 Further, the
court noted that, however “mysterious” the result might be, craigs-
list was the dominant provider of classified listings and earned sig-
nificant revenues from its operations.248
Nevertheless, the court concluded that craigslist could not assert
stewardship as a rationale for refusing to monetize the full spec-
trum of its classified advertisements.249 According to the court, the
problem was that craigslist’s controlling owners, James Buckmaster
and Craig Newmark, owed a fiduciary duty of loyalty to a minority
investor, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. (eBay).250 The narrow
dispute involved defensive measures taken by craigslist’s board to
limit eBay’s ability to acquire a greater ownership stake in the
future.251 Behind those corporate machinations was the funda-
mental question of corporate purpose.252 Buckmaster and Newmark
objected that eBay’s eventual acquisition of craigslist “would fun-
damentally alter craigslist’s values, culture and business model,
243. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 775 (2005) (“[S]ome discretion to sacrifice profits is an inevitable byproduct of the
business judgment rule.”).
244. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 6-7 (Del. Ch. 2010).
245. See id. at 33.
246. Id. at 8.
247. Id.
248. Id. (“[C]raigslist’s unique business strategy continues to be successful, even if it does
run counter to the strategies used by the titans of online commerce.”).
249. See id. at 33.
250. Id. at 25-26.
251. See id. at 32.
252. See id.
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including departing from [craigslist’s] public-service mission in favor
of increased monetization of craigslist.”253
Rejecting that argument, the court held that craigslist’s justifica-
tion for its actions could not rest on “culture” and had to, at the end
of the day, maximize shareholder profits: “Jim and Craig did not
make any serious attempt to prove that the craigslist culture, which
rejects any attempt to further monetize its services, translates into
increased profitability for stockholders.”254 Giving away services
could perhaps be justified as a business strategy, but “[p]romoting,
protecting, or pursuing nonstockholder considerations must lead
at some point to value for stockholders.”255
Importantly, the court’s holding did not turn on its interpretation
of the contract between eBay and the craigslist founders, pursuant
to which eBay had agreed to take a minority stake in craigslist.256
Indeed, the court noted that eBay had elected not to pursue con-
tract-based arguments.257 Instead, eBay asserted a claim premised
on breaches of fiduciary duty258—and prevailed, notwithstanding
craigslist’s well-known commitment to a culture of stewardship.259
By using the concept of fiduciary duty to force controlling owners
to prioritize shareholder profits, the court reduced the business
judgment rule to a question of means rather than ends and refused
to credit the viability of craigslist’s distinctive business strategy.260
To identify profits as the sole legitimate objective of the corporate
form is to endorse an impoverished view of what corporations can
accomplish. When the controlling owners are not seeking to enrich
themselves or their families, and merely wish to serve as respon-
sible business stewards for the benefit of all stakeholders, the ob-
ligation of loyalty should not be used to coerce compliance with a
shareholder-maximization model of corporate governance.
253. Id. (quoting Defendants’ Post-Trial Answering Brief at 54, eBay Domesting Holdings,
Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010) (No. 3705-CC)).
254. Id. at 33.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 27.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 7.
259. See id. at 32-33, 35.
260. See id. at 33.
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CONCLUSION
According to conventional wisdom, insider control of businesses
is detrimental to the interests of noncontrolling investors.261 Family-
run businesses, in particular, are seen as nepotistic and ineffi-
cient.262 Although commentators identify potential downsides of
insider control,263 they overlook the significant benefits that con-
trolled companies can offer.
This Article argues that controlled companies can soften the
harder edges of capitalism by bringing the values of controlling
owners into the marketplace. Unlike the managers of public cor-
porations with widely dispersed shareholders, controlling owners
have a personal stake that gives them reason to identify with their
business and to care about its long-term success. A stewardship
model signals commitment to other investors while also potentially
benefiting employees, customers, and communities.
Among other implications, this Article’s analysis suggests that
regulatory pressure to prohibit dual-stock offerings or insist that
they “sunset” after a limited period of time is misguided. The ar-
gument is not that controlling owners will always engage in stew-
ardship, or that the risk of self-dealing by controlling owners should
be ignored. However, rather than impose a one-size-fits-all model of
corporate governance to forestall the possibility of opportunism, this
Article concludes that courts should address abuses of control by
applying the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty already owed by
controlling owners.
261. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
